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SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURE FOR COURT 
DETERMINATION OF DISPUTES UNDER NEW 
YORK'S CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES 
Jay C. Carlisle* 
The introduction of the Individual Assignment System 
(US)' in 1986, and recently enacted laws addressing tort re- 
form2 and alternative dispute resolution3 have heightened the 
debate between the bar and judiciary as to the most appropriate 
method of managing efficiently' the high volume of cases in New 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; J.D. University of California a t  
Davis, A.B. University of California a t  Los Angeles. The author is grateful to John Mulli- 
gan and Gail Matthews for their research assistance. He dedicates this article to Profes- 
sor Peter J. O'Connor, who is a true dean of New York Civil Practice. 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGS. tit. 22, 3 202.3(a) (1986). See notes 237-39 and ac- 
companying text infra. See generally Brodsky, Civil Practice, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 264, 
288 (1986); Carlisle, Annual Survey of New York Civil Practice, 38 SYRACUSE L.REV. 67, 
83-85 (1987); The Uniform Rules Take Effect (January 6, 1986), Part I: The Individual 
Assignment System, 312 N.Y. ST. L. DIG. 1 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter Individual Assign- 
ment System]; Text of Review Panel's Report on IAS (IAS Study Report by Office of 
Court Administration), N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1987, a t  5, col. 1. "Plaintiffs are 'far more suc- 
cessful' in the 1980's than they were in the previous 20 years, a Rand Corp. study of civil 
verdicts in California and Cook County, Ill., discovers. In Cook County, plaintiffs moved 
from winning one fourth of products liability and malpractice cases in the 1960s to win- 
ning half such trials in the 1980's; the average malpractice award more than tripled." '87 
EVENTS: March, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 4, 1988, a t  S-6, col. 2. 
See notes 7-13 and accompanying text infra. ABA's House of Delegates on March 
2,1987 "approves a tort reform policy that rejects caps on damages recovered by injured 
plaintiffs for pain and suffering, but recommends greater judicial scrutiny of damage 
awards. '87 EVENTS: March, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 4, 1988, a t  S-6, col. 2. 
Ch. 156, [I9841 N.Y. Laws (McKinney) (makes the Community Dispute Resolu- 
tion Centers Program a permanent component of the New York Unified Court System); 
Ch. 91, [I9851 N.Y. Laws 405 (McKinney) (chapter 91 allows Community Dispute Reso- 
lution Centers to make monetary awards equal to the monetary jurisdiction of the Small 
Claims Part of Justice Courts); Ch. 837, [I9861 N.Y. Laws 1967 (McKinney) (allowing 
selected felony cases to be referred to an alternative dispute resolution center with the 
consent of the people, the defendant and the victim). 
' See Wise, IAS 'Effective' in First Year But Needs Some Improvement, N.Y.L.J., 
Feb. 20, 1987, a t  1, col. 3 [hereinafter Wise, IAS 'Effective']; Johnson, New York Court 
Study Says System is Faster, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1987, a t  B1, col. 2; Baetich, IAS 
'Unworkable' (letter to the editor), N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4,1987, a t  2, col. 6; Bellacosa, Alterna- 
tive Dispute Plan Improves Justice System, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 1987, a t  25, col. 1. See 
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York state c o ~ t s . ~  Although the IAS has reduced court conges- 
tion, an estimated eighteen percent of the cases now pending 
before the courts have been in the judicial system longer than 
fifteen rn~n th s .~  In addition, changes relating to the statute of 
limitations for products liability actions,? joint and several liabil- 
ity: itemized verdicts: periodic payments of awards,1° payments 
generally Broder, Trial Tactics, Techniques: Sauce for the Gander, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9, 
1986, at 1, col. 1; McLaughlin, New Joint, Several Liability Law: Problems for Lawyers 
and Judges, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1,1986, at 1, col. 3; Cook, N.Y. Law Likely to Spur Filings of 
Toxic-Tort Claims, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1986, at 16, col. 1; Connors, An Analysis of New 
York's Medical Malpractice Reform, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Mollen, Bar's 
Cooperation Urged for New I.A.S. to Succeed, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15,1986, at 29, col. 1; Wise, 
Individual Assignment System Begins Operations Today, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 6, 1986, at 1, 
col. 2. See generally Wise, Battle Lines Are Being Drawn In  Fight Over Toxic Tort Law, 
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Law Signed to Extend Time for Filing Toxic-Tort 
Suits, N.Y.L.J., July 31, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Rheingold, The New Statute of Limitations in  
Tort Actions i n  New York, N.Y.L.J., July 29, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Hoenig, More on Tort 
Reform - The New Statutes, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Marlin & Levy, New 
York Adopts Discovery Rule for Latent-Disease Cases, N.Y.L.J., July 7 ,  1986, at 1, col. 
3; Fox, Interim Report by Governor's Commission: Reforms in  Liability Insurance 
Urged by State Advisory Panel, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 8,1986, at 1, col. 3; Memorandum o f  Sen. 
Stafford (this memorandum by Senator Ronald B. Stafford o f  the New York State Sen- 
ate accompanied Senate Bill 9391A and discussed the purpose o f  a discovery statute of  
limitation rule) (available in files o f  the Brooklyn Law Review). 
Over 3.5 million actions were filed in  New York state courts during 1987. CASELOAD 
ACTIVITY REPORTING SYSTEM OF T H E  OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION OF T H E  UNIFIED 
COURT SYSTEM OF T H E  STATE OF NEW YORK (1987) (statistical breakdown of  actions filed 
in New York state courts) (available in the files o f  the Brooklyn Law Review). See also 
The  Hon. Chief Judge Sol Wachtler, Remarks at the Annual Dinner of  the New York 
State Bar Association (Jan. 17, 1986) (available in the files o f  the Brooklyn Law Review). 
Judge Wachtler notes that the number o f  cases disposed o f  each year by  New York state 
courts is ten times the number o f  cases disposed o f  each year by the entire federal judici- 
ary.). See also REPORT TO T H E  CHIEF JUDGE AND CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF T H E  
REVIEW COMMITTEE ON 1986 INDMDUAL ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM OPERATIONS 6-8 (1987) 
[hereinafter REPORT O T H E  CHIEF JUDGE]; EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF T H E  CHIEF ADMIN- 
ISTRATOR OF T H E  COURTS 2-1 (1986) [hereinafter CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR'S REPORT] (availa- 
ble in  the files of  the Brooklyn Law Review). 
See note 248 and accompanying text infra. 
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R 3 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted by Ch. 682, 
[I9861 N.Y. Laws 1565 (McKinney) (significantly alters the three year statute o f  limita- 
tions for personal injury and property damage cases by  providing that the period starts 
to  run from the date o f  discovery, and thus revives certain causes o f  action that would 
have been time barred). 
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 1600-1603 (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted by Ch. 
682, [I9861 N.Y. Laws 1565 (McKinney) (transforms the law of  joint and several liability 
in  tort cases by limiting the liability o f  persons jointly liable). 
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 8 4111(f) (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted by Ch. 682, $i 
7 ,  [I9861 N.Y. Laws 1569 (McKinney) (requires that upon a finding o f  damages, courts 
must instruct the jury to specify the applicable elements o f  special and general damages 
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from collateral sources,ll health care arbitration,12 and court-im- 
posed sanctions for frivolous claimsls are placing additional bur- 
dens on an already overworked judiciary.14 
Although concern over increasing court congestion has led 
to the adoption of several simplified means of resolving dis- 
putes,16 many commentators argue that more efforts should be 
made to divert court cases into both formal and informal statu- 
tory dispute resolution areas.16 They champion methods such as 
on which the award is based and the amount assigned to each element). 
lo  N.Y. CIV. Pmc.  L. & R. $ 5041 (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted b y  Ch. 682, 
[I9861 N.Y. Laws 1570 (McKinney) (requires that the jury render a verdict that itemizes 
damages between past special, past general, future special, and future general damages). 
" N.Y. CN. PRAC. L. & R. !j 4545 (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted b y  Ch. 220, !j 
36, [I9861 N.Y. Laws 386 (McKinney) (applicable to personal injury, property damage or 
wrongful death actions where a plaintiff seeks to recover economic losses - i f  the court 
determines that any past or future expense will be indemnified in whole or in  part from 
any collateral source, it must reduce the plaintiffs recovery). 
la N.Y. CN. Pmc. L. & R. !j 3045 (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted by  Ch. 266, $ 3 ,  
[I9861 N.Y. Laws 472 (McKinney) (defendant may demand that plaintiff consent to ar- 
bitration upon a cession o f  liability in  medical and dental malpractice cases). 
l3 N.Y. CIV. Pmc.  L. & R. $ 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted b y  Ch. 220,!j 
35, [I9861 N.Y. Laws 386 (McKinney) (applicable to actions for personal injury, property 
damage or wrongful death cases and provides that in the event any party files a frivolous 
claim or defense, courts may award reasonable costs and attorney fees). For a discussion 
o f  the new laws, see Carlisle, supra note 1, at 79-82. 
" See note 5 supra, and notes 149-56 and accompanying text infra. 
I V e e  9 U.S.C. $ 3 (1982) (Arbitration Act); N.Y. INS.  LAW $ 5106(b) (McKinney 
1985) (compulsory arbitration o f  no-fault claims at option o f  insured); N.Y. LAB. LAW !j 
716(2) (McKinney 1977) (compulsory arbitration o f  labor grievance against non-profit 
hospital); N.Y. Cm. Pmc. L. & R. $ 3405 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (permitting chief judge 
o f  Court o f  Appeals to promulgate rules for arbitration o f  claims not exceeding $6,000 
pending in any court). See generally Cooke, The  Highways and Byways of Dispute Res- 
olution, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 611 (1981); Goldstein, Alternatives for Resolving Business 
Transaction Disputes, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 69 (1983). 
Bellacosa, supra note 4, at 28, col. 4. See H. ZEISEL, H. &VEN & B. BUCHHOLZ, 
DELAY I N  T H E  COURT (2d ed. 1978); Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 
69 A.BA J. 442 (1983); see also Breger, The Justice Conundrum, 28 VILL. L. REV. 923, 
952-55 (1983); Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation: An  Alternate Ap- 
proach, 11 LOY. L.AL. REV. 493, 501 (1978); Neighborhood Justice of Chicago - The 
Success and the Challenge, 18 DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1,16 (1986) (prepared by  the Ameri- 
can Bar Association Special Committee on Dispute Resolution); Zinman, Mediation or 
Arbitration of Insurance Claims, 12 WESTCHESTER BAR JOURNAL 151 (1985); Lewin, Bus- 
iness and the Law: The Big Debate Over Litigation, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1986, at D2, 
col. 1; Metaxas, Alternatives to Litigation are Maturing, Nat'l L.J., May 12, 1986, at 1, 
col. 3; Judges End Cases Faster Using Trial Alternatives, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1986, at 
AS, col. 1; Danforth, A Need for Uniform Laws, Faster Trials, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1,1985 
$ 3, at 2, col. 3; Brodeur, Annals of Law: The  Asbestos Industry on Trial, THE NEW 
YORKER, July 1, 1985, at 36; Coca-Cola General Counsel Praises Mini-Trial, Arbitration 
Times, Winter 1986, at 5, col. 1 (American Arbitration Association Dispute Resolution 
Heinonline - -  54 Brook. L. Rev. 9 7  1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9  
98 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54: 95 
arbitration," administrative proceedings,ls summary jury tri- 
als,19 mini-trials,2O mediation:' private and 
News); Chief Justice Supports Arbitration, Arbitration Times, Fall 1985, at 1, col. 1; 
ADR Theme of New York Arbitration Day, Arbitration Times, Summer 1985, at 1, col. 4 
(remarks on May 10, 1985 at eighth annual Arbitration Day of  AAA); Sander, Report on 
the National Conference on Minor Disputes Resolution (May 1977) (ABA Report on 
Dispute Resolution) (available in the files o f  the Brooklyn Law Review); CBS Evening 
News Special Report, Sept. 6, 1985 (over one million workers each year are being fired 
and many o f  them seek redress in courts o f  law). 
See E. JOHNSON, V .  KANTOR & E. SCHWARTZ, OUTSIDE T H E  COURTS: A SURVEY OF 
DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES I N CIVIL CASES 39 (1977) [hereinafter JOHNSON, KANTOR & 
SCHWARTZ] ("Arbitration is the most significant alternative forum which has developed 
in  the United States."); Ferguson, The Adjudication of Commercial Disputes and the 
Legal System in  Modern England, 7 BRIT. J. L. & SOC'Y 141, 145 (1980) ("The present- 
day position is that arbitration is firmly established as the most used adjudicative mech- 
anism."); Green, Marks & Olson, supra note 16, at 494-95 ("Arbitration stands as almost 
the only well-developed alternative to  full-scale litigation for entities which find them- 
selves embroiled in disputes which cannot be solved through normal business negotia- 
tions!'); Nader & Singer, Law in  the Future: What Are the Choices?, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 
281, 284 (1976) ("Arbitration has developed without the aid o f  the judicial system - in 
fact, despite its early opposition."). See generally M. DOMKE, T H E  LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION $8 1.01-1.03 (1968); S. LAZARUS, J. BRAY, L. CARTER, K. COLLINS, 
B. GIEDT, R. HOLTON, P. MA~THEWS & G. WILLARD, RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES: T H E  
POTENTIAL OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 35-40 (1965). 
l8 See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1984); Breger, The APA: An Ad- 
ministrative Conference Perspective, 72 VA. L. REV. 337 (1986); Sargentich, The Reform 
of the American Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 W I S .  L. REV. 
385 (1984); Symposium on Administrative Law, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 693 (1984). See 
also Gifford, The New York State Administrative Procedure Act: Some Reflections 
Upon Its Structure and Legislative History, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 589 (1977). See notes 
100-13 and accompanying text infra. 
Is Metaxas, supra note 16, at 1, col. 3. See Wikinson, Alternative Dispute Resolu- 
tion - The Summary Jury Trial, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 1987, at 1, cols. 3-4. See notes 126- 
31 and accompanying text infra. 
20 See Dalton, Benefits of Mini-Trials Discussed by Attorneys, Arbitration Times, 
Fall 1986, at 7 ,  col. 1; Green, Marks & Olson, supra note 16. See also notes 144-48 and 
accompanying text infra. 
21 W .  S IMKIN & Ii. FIDANDIS, MEDIATION A D T H E  DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAIN- 
ING 23-35 (2d ed. 1986) (mediation is defined as active intervention from a neutral third 
party who employs non-adversarial techniques in attempting to  reach a negotiated set- 
tlement). See generally Silberman & Schepard, Court-Ordered Mediation i n  Family 
Disputes: The New York Proposal, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 741,741-42 nn.4 & 
5 (1986). 
22 Cratsley, Community Courts: Offering Alternative Dispute Resolution Within 
the Judicial System, 3 VT. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1978) (screening is an informal process in 
which a third party narrows the issues for trial). 
23 In private trials, disputes are resolved by non-government private courts, presided 
over by former judges and experts in the contested matter. Areas of  dispute resolution 
handled by private tribunals include "personal injury claims, uninsured and underin- 
sured motorist insurance coverage, first party automobile insurance claims, tort litiga- 
tion, commercial disputes, labor and employment rights litigation, domestic relations is- 
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community dispute resolution ~enters.2~ Other commentators ar- 
gue that the perception of crisis in the courts is overblown and 
that alternative dispute resolution forums needlessly duplicate 
functions that should be performed by courts.26 This debate has 
focused primarily on when the judicial decisionmaking process 
should be replaced by alternative dispute resolution forums. No 
commentator has yet addressed the issue of whether New York's 
Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes 
(SPCDD),2e enacted in 1956,2= offers an acceptable method for 
minimizing court congesti0n.2~ 
The SPCDD is available for the resolution of any justiciable 
sues and intra-professional disputes." Castro, Public Service, Private Profits, TIME, Feb. 
10, 1986, at 64 (describes phenomenon in justice system known as "privatization," which 
is becoming increasingly commonplace across the United States). See Silas, Costly Law 
Suits, 72 A B A  J., July 1, 1986, at 19, col. 1.; De Sando, Rented Scales of Justice Ends 
\irait for Day in  Court, Asbury Park Press, June 23, 1986, at  Al, col. 1; Tolchin, Private 
Courts With Binding Rulings Draw Interest and Some Challenges, N.Y. Times, May 12, 
1985, at 38, col. 1 (private courts thrive because people do not have access t o  congested 
public courts). 
Concerns esist that private courts short-cut procedural guarantees that make up  our 
concept o f  fairness. See JUDICATE, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 1985 (brochure describing a na- 
tionat private court system) (available in  the files o f  the Brooklyn Law Review); see 
notes 120-29 and accompanying tes t  infra. 
24 Christian, Community Dispute Resolution: First-Class Process or Second-Class 
Justice?, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 771 (1986). See notes 149-52 and accompany- 
ing test  infra. See also Bellacosa, supra note 4, at  28, col. 4. 
" Study Shows No Litigation Explosion in America, 19 DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3 
(1986) (referring t o  study released by  National Center for State Courts indicating that 
current growth o f  litigation is due primarily to population growth). See Motley, W h y  W e  
are a Nation of Litigators, 6 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 9, 17 (litigation tide that currently 
engulfs us is healthy and has its roots in  American judicial system); Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 840, 942 (1984) (numbers other than filing rates must be examined t o  ac- 
count for increased litigation); Metasas, supra note 16, at 8, col. 3 (time saving contem- 
plated by alternative dispute resolution less than anticipated). See also Resnik, Manage- 
rial Judges and Court Delay: The  Unproven Assumptions, 23 JUDGES J. 8, 11 (1984) 
("[I l t  is difficult to  isolate and weigh accurately the actual effect ( i f  any) o f  managerial 
judging on the speed o f  trial court disposition."). 
l6 See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. $8 3031-3037 (McKinney 1974). 
27 Ch. 219, [I9561 N.Y. Laws 249 (McKinney). 
l8 For a general discussion o f  New York's Simplified Procedure for Court Determi- 
nation of Disputes (SPCDD), see Goldstein, supra note 15, at 83-87; The Quarterly Sur- 
vey of New York Practice, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 355, 373-74 (1971); Legislation, 28 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 133 (1961); JaEe, Simplified Procedure for Determination of Disputes 
Compared with Arbitration and Ordinary Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 14, 1961, at 4, col. 1; 
Tripp, Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Contract Disputes: Judicial 
"Arbitration" in New York, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1961, at  4, col. 1; Callahan, New Simpli- 
fied Procedure Act, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 24, 1961, at 4, col. 1. 
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controversy, provided both sides agree to its applicati0n.3~ The 
procedure has been utilized in a variety of contexts, including 
commercial, matrimonial, real property, and collective bargain- 
ing disputes;s0 however, its application has yet to be extended 
into the area of tort law.s1 The SPCDD offers a simplified proce- 
dures2 that dispenses with summonses and ~omplaints,9~ pre- 
Pg See 3 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ll 3031.02 
(1986) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER]; D. SIEGEL, HANDBOOK ON NEW YORK 
PRAC~CE $ 609, at  876 (1978) ("[The SPCDD] is apparently available for any subject 
matter . . . ."); 0. CHASE. CIVIL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK § 23.05 (1983) ("Any justiciable 
controversy, regardless of subject matter, may be submitted to the court."). See also 
FIFTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 103 (1960) [hereinafter FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT], 
which states in material part: 
While i t  may be expected that this new procedure will be used most frequently 
by the business community, because of its peculiar needs, there is no provision 
barring its use by other persons in cases not connected with commerce. Indeed, 
there is no reason why this procedure should not be available to any parties 
who feel they would like t~ use it, in any type case, even in negligence actions. 
I t  is also felt that any attempt to limit the use of the procedure to "merchants" 
in "commercial disputes" would be unwise. A great deal of unnecessary litiga- 
tion might be caused in the attempt to work out a final definition of these 
terms. 
Id. 
30 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3031.02 n.13 (citing Soffer v. 
Elmerdorf, 108 A.D.2d 954, 484 N.Y.S.2d 941 (3d Dep't 1985) (action by attorneys for 
legal fees due); Aloi v. Bd. of Educ. of W. Babylon, 81 A.D.2d 874,439 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d 
Dep't 1981) (action for declaratory judgment and money damages for breach of collective 
bargaining agreement); Gerstein v. 532 Broad Hollow Rd. Co., 75 A.D.2d 292, 429 
N.Y.S.2d 195 (1st Dep't 1980) (action for monies due based on breach of contract for 
first refusal in sale of real property); Kessler v. Kessler, 24 A.D.2d 601,262 N.Y.S.2d 288 
(2d Dep't 1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 796,218 N.E.2d 299, 271 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1966) (actions 
for an accounting and declaration of rights of parties arising out of real estate venture); 
Eagle Star Ins. Co. of America v. Gen. Accident, Fire & Life Ins. Co., 100 Misc. 2d 792, 
420 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1979) (action to apportion liability between two 
insurers who agreed to total settlement amount); Gutman v. Sal-Vio Masons, Inc., 72 
Misc. 2d 729, 339 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 1972) (action for purchase price of 
construction materials sold and delivered); Hammerstein v. Woodlawn Cemetery, 21 
Misc. 2d 42, 194 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1960) (dispute over burial rights)). 
3' 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3031.02 (citing N.Y. Kandy 
Kard Corp. v. Barton's Candy Corp., 32 A.D.2d 513, 298 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st Dep't 1969) 
(although contract provided for use of SPCDD, the court found that issues sounding in 
tort'did not come under that provision; that defendant had waived use of SPCDD by 
participating in litigation; and that i t  would be wasteful to use different procedures in 
the same case)). 
The SPCDD developed from a suggestion in 1955 by the Hon. David W. Peck, 
Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, First Department, to John B. Johnson, State 
Administrator of Courts, that a simplified means of handling court cases might be feasi- 
ble. See SEVENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 88 (1962) [hereinafter SEVENTH AN- 
NUAL REPORT]. 
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trial disclosure,3' trial by most of the ordinary rules of 
interlocutory appeals from nonfinal orders:? and 
The impetus for the enactment of the simplified procedure was the desire to provide 
an expeditious means of hearing and determining commercial controversies that the bus- 
iness community had increasingly resolved through arbitration, however, the statutory 
provisions have never been restricted to commercial disputes. FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 29, a t  103. The original proposal by the Judicial Conference for broadening 
the provisions was based on the simplified procedure promulgated for the British Com- 
mercial Court and would have specifically limited application of this procedure to com- 
mercial disputes. FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, a t  96-106. That proposed statute 
was found to be "cumbersome and formidable in appearance." SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra, a t  88. Because section 218-a was available only to parties to a current dispute, 
who could agree to submit their controversy to the courts pursuant to the SPCDD, i t  was 
of limited use to the business community. The Judicial Conference recognized this and 
recommended that the applicability of the simplified procedure be broadened to permit 
parties to a contract to provide that any future disputes be litigated pursuant to the 
SPCDD. THIRD ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 104-06 (1958). Thereafter, the Confer- 
ence proposed amendments to clarify section 218-a and expand the procedure by adding 
two additional sections. FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, a t  96-97. These sections 
and the rules promulgated to govern them were incorporated into the draft of the Civil 
Practice Law and Rules which was to replace the C.P.A., after the final Report of the 
Advisory Committee was issued. They became sections 3031 through 3037 of the New 
York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 
29, a t  n 3031.01. 
33 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  V3031.03 (citing Hammerstein v. 
Woodlawn Cemetery, 21 Misc. 2d 42, 194 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1960)). See 
generally Legislation, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 563 (1956) ("[Alll that is necessary is a simple 
statement, signed by the parties or their attorneys, specifying the claims and defenses 
. . . and the relief requested."). 
34 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  n3036.07. CPLR section 3036(5) 
gives the court discretion to order whatever pretrial disclosure is necessary to promote a 
speedy hearing. The SPCDD has a significant advantage over arbitration in this respect. 
See In re Katz, 3 A.D.2d 238, 160 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1st Dep't 1957). 
35 The right of parties to a trial by jury is waived when a controversy is submitted 
pursuant to the SPCDD, except where the existence of a contractual provision authoriz- 
ing use of the SPCDD is in question. See 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, 
a t  ll 3034.03. 
3s CPLR section 3035(b) renders inapplicable "the technical rules of evidence" to 
the extent provided by CPLR section 3036. CPLR section 3036(1) provides that the rules 
for the admissibility of evidence shall not apply to the taking of testimony or the adduc- 
ing of proof in an action tried under the SPCDD. Exceptions to this rule should be 
noted: (1) The court may order that rules of evidence be applicable; and (2) that the 
usual rules with respect to privileged communications apply (i.e., CPLR sections 4501- 
4506). 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  1 3036.02. The court may sua 
sponte order expert testimony. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R § 3036(2) (McKinney Supp. 1974). 
37 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 3037 (McKinney 1974). See generally 3 WEINSTEIN, 
KORN & MILLER, Supra note 29, a t  n 3037.01: 
In order to prevent the subversion of the economies in time and expense ef- 
fected by the Simplified Procedure, CPLR 3037 eliminates the right of appeal 
from an intermediate order of the court except with the permission of the 
court trying the action or the appellate court and, thus, supersedes CPLR 
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normal appellate review of judicial findings of fact.38 Unlike 
other informal methods of dispute resolution, substantive princi- 
ples of New York law govern under the SPCDD.3s 
Although the SPCDD is not often utilized,'O its potential for 
alleviating crowded court dockets merits a critical review. Part I 
of this Article discusses the history of the SPCDD and describes 
its provisions. Part I1 compares the SPCDD with alternative 
methods of dispute resolution in New York and Part I11 offers 
suggestions as to why lawyers are reluctant to take advantage of 
the simplified procedure. Part IV evaluates the ways in which 
the SPCDD is particularly compatible with the IAS and suggests 
methods for the SPCDD's full implementation. 
I. THE SPCDD: ITS HISTORY AND PROVISIONS 
The adoption of the SPCDD in 1956" represented a desire 
on the part of the legislature to take a "fresh approach to dis- 
pute resolution by combining aspects of arbitration and formal 
- -- -- -- - 
5701. A party may only appeal as of right from a judgment or an order that 
determines whether a contract or submission was made or complied with. Re- 
view of the intermediate orders is preserved, however, and can be obtained on 
appeal from the judgment. 
Id. (citing N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 3 5501(a) (McKinney 1978) (scope of review from final 
judgment)); Cohen v. Cohen, 3 N.Y.2d 339, 144 N.E.2d 355, 165 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1957). 
38 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. $ 3037 (McKinney 1974) provides in pertinent part: "A 
decision of the trial judge on the facts shall be final if there is any substantial evidence 
to support it." Id. 
The scope of review of the factual findings in an action tried under the SPCDD is 
the same as the scope of judicial review of findings of fact by administrative bodies pur- 
suant to CPLR section 7803(4). Under the latter provision, a court is limited in re-exam- 
ining evidence to whether the factual findings of a body or officer are "supported by 
substantial evidence." N.Y. Cm. PRAC. L. & R. $ 7803(4) (McKinney 1981). See also 8 
WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  1 7803.04. Generally, the appellate divi- 
sion is free to review questions of law and questions of fact. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R 3 
5501(c) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1988). The "standard on appeal is whether the judg- 
ment below was against the weight of the evidence (see CPLR 5522 and CPLR 5712): 3 
WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3037.02. The substantive law of New 
York governs on appeal. D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, $ 609, a t  876. 
Ss See 0. CHASE, supra note 29, a t  3 23.05; D. SIEGEL, supra note 29,s 609, a t  876; 3 
WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3036. 
'O D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, 3 609, a t  876. See also notes 156-68 and accompanying 
text infra. 
" Ch. 219 [I9561 N.Y. Laws 249 (McKinney). For background on the SPCDD, see 3 
WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3031.01. For a general description of 
procedure, see 0. CHASE, CPLR MANUAL $ 31.16 (1980); 0. CHASE, supra note 29, a t  3 
23.05; Goldstein, supra note 15, a t  83-86, nn.49-62; D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, a t  $ 609. 
Heinonline - -  54 Brook. L. Rev. 1 0 2  1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9  
19883 COURT DETERMINATION OF DISPUTES 103 
litigation for use within the existing judicial ~ystem."'~ The pro- 
cedure applies to any justiciable controversy over which a court 
has juri~diction.'~ 
The SPCDD is applicable where parties to an existing con- 
troversy agree to commence an action under the procedure," or 
to continue an action without pleadings after a summons has 
been ser~ed,'~ or where parties to a contract provide for its use 
in future controver~ies.'~ An action is commenced by filing a sin- 
gle clear and concise statement, signed by the parties, which sets 
forth their claims, defenses, and the relief sought.'? Once the 
42 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3031.01. The SPCDD was in- 
tended to be the beginning of a process that would take a new and imaginative view of 
other aspects of New York procedure that were in need of simplification. Weinstein, 
Trends in Civil Practice, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (1962). 
43 3 WEINSTEIN. KORN & MILLER. supra note 29, a t  73031.02; see also FIFTH ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 29, a t  103. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra. 
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3 3031 (McKinney 1974). An action under the SPCDD is 
consensual in nature and cannot be commenced unilaterally. 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & 
MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3031.03. If the parties cannot agree on whether there was a 
consent agreement, the party wishing to use the SPCDD must move to settle the term of 
the statement in question. Id. (citing Perritano v. Town of Marnaroneck, 102 A.D.2d 854, 
476 N.Y.S.2d 625 (2d Dep't 1984) (article 78 proceeding dismissed as inappropriate to 
compel agreement to an SPCDD statement); Time Writers, Inc. v. Coleman, 67 Misc. 2d 
258, 323 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga Cty. 1971) (motion for default judgment de- 
nied where plaintiff had attempted to commence action unilaterally by mailing a signed 
statement to adversary). 
N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. 3 3031 (McKinney 1974). 
46 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3 3033(1) (McKinney 1974) (provides that parties may 
enter into a contract to submit any existing or future controversy to the court for deter- 
mination under the SPCDD). CPLR section 3033 does not specify any particular lan- 
guage that must be inserted in contracts. CPLR section 3031 suggests that a reference to 
the "New York Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes" is sufficient. 
3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3033.01 (citing Mercury Coal & Coke, 
Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe and Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1982) (preliminary 
injunction against commencement of action under SPCDD should not have been granted 
where contract contained provision for submission, which was prima facie valid, and no 
showing was made either of grounds to  vitiate contract or of such serious inconvenience 
that party would be deprived of opportunity to defend)). See also Copeland Planned 
Futures, Inc. v. Obenchain, 9 Wash. App. 32,510 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1973) (where clause 
providing "that any dispute arising out of this note shall be governed by the New York 
Supreme Court in and for the County of Onondaga, pursuant to 'New York Simplified 
Procedure for Determination of Disputes,' NYCPLR 3031-3037, with personal jurisdic- 
tion hereby consented to for that purpose, and New York law to govern," found valid, 
and default judgment based on clause given full faith and credit by another state). See 3 
WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  n 3033.01. 
47 N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. § 3031 (McKinney 1974). "By commencing the action in 
this fashion, the parties consent to the application of the procedure set forth in CPLR 
3034, CPLR 3035, and CPLR 3036 and waive their right to jury trial." 3 WEINSTEIN, 
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statement is agreed to or settled by the ~ourt , '~  it is filed with 
the court accompanied by a note of i~sue.'~ Amended or supple- 
mental statements may be served or filed at  any time during the 
proceeding, within the court's d is~re t ion .~~ 
The SPCDD permits the court to hold a pre-trial conference 
as a means of encouraging an expeditious disposition of the ac- 
tion on issues of law without resorting to a trial.61 The court has 
discretion at  the pre-trial conference, or a t  any other time dur- 
ing the proceeding, to: (I) order or allow service of an additional 
or amended statement; (2) direct pre-trial disclosure and discov- 
ery; (3) permit the taking of depositions; (4) limit the number of 
expert witnesses; (5) clarify and define the issues to be tried; (6) 
stay or consolidate related actions; and (7) grant summary judg- 
ment.62 A default judgment can be entered if a party fails to 
serve a statement within the time set by the court or fails to 
appear after proper notice.6s By agreeing to have controversies 
resolved pursuant to the SPCDD, the parties waive their right to 
trial by The statute provides, however, that if there is a 
substantial question as to the existence or validity of a contract 
provision to utilize the procedure, either party may demand a 
jury trial on this issue.66 Should the jury conclude that a valid 
KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3031.03. Under some circumstances the statement 
can be waived. See, e.g., Stell Mfg. Corp. v. Century Indus., 23 A.D.2d 281, 260 N.Y.S.2d 
547 (1st Dep't), aff'd,  16 N.Y.2d 1020,213 N.E.2d 313,265 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1965) (when no 
objection made as to absence of required statement, service of statement deemed 
waived). 
If the parties have agreed contractually to submit a dispute to the court under the 
SPCDD, yet cannot agree on the contents of the statement of claims and defenses, 
CPLR section 3033(2) provides that either party can then move to have the court "set- 
tle" the terms of the statement. 3 WEINSTEIN. KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, at  1 
3033.03. 
'e N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3 3031 (McKinney 1974). See 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & 
MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3031.03 ("The signing of the statement constitutes a certifi- 
cate that the issues are genuine and the filing of the statement and a note of issue acts as 
a joinder of issues."); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3 3036(b) (McKinney 1974) (describes re- 
quirements for filing of notice of issue); See 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 
29, at  ll 3036.08. 
50 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3 3032 (McKinney 1974). For a discussion of the court's 
discretion to permit amendments under CPLR section 3032, see 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & 
MILLER, supra note 29, at  ll 3032.02. 
51 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3035(a) (McKinney 1974). 
6z Id. at  3 3036(5). 
I q d .  a t  3 3036(4). 
" Id. a t  3 3033(1). 
55 Id. a t  $3 3033(2), 3034(3). 
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contract to adopt the SPCDD exists, "the jury must be dis- 
charged, and the controversy determined by the court as pro- 
vided in section 3036."66 Should the jury conclude that there is 
no valid contract between the parties to use the SPCDD, the 
court must order the case to proceed as an ordinary action.67 
The SPCDD permits the court to fashion a procedure to be 
followed at trial to fit the particular circumstances of each case. 
To expedite the hearing of an action, the court may follow a 
simple and informal p ro~edure .~~  The statute provides that the 
court may dispense with the usual rules of evidence and proce- 
dure, and these rules shall not be used to exclude or restrict the 
taking of testimony and adducing of proof.69 The court may, 
however, exercise its discretion to apply the ordinary rules of ev- 
iden~e.~O In addition, the court may direct the parties to obtain 
the advice of an impartial expert if it determines that this ad- 
vice would be material in deciding the action, and may direct 
the parties to share in the payment of the expert's fees and ex- 
'' 3 WEINSTEIN. KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  1 3034.03. 
Id. (citing Kores Mfg. Corp. v. Standard Packaging Corp., 31 A.D.2d 622, 295 
N.Y.S.2d 862 (1st Dep't 1968) (plaintiffs motion to settle terms of statement denied 
with leave to renew, if available, upon determination in a plenary action of question of 
fraud in the inducement; order of lower court referring issues to referee and staying ac- 
tion by defendant for rescission and damages reversed)). See FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 29, a t  98. 
s8 CPLR section 3036 implements the authorization in CPLR section 3035 to pro- 
vide a simplified procedure for SPCDD actions. The nine paragraphs of CPLR section 
3036 provide only an outline of the practice that courts may follow. Courts may also 
tailor the procedure to fit the particular facts of each case. 3 WEINSTEIN. KORN & MILLER, 
supra note 29, a t  ll 3036.01. 
Id. a t  B 3036.02 ("Paragraph (1) of the CPLR 3036 provides that the rules for the 
admissibility of evidence . . . shall not apply . . . in an action tried under the Simplified 
Procedure."). See aka id. a t  3 3035.03 ("Subdivision (b) renders inapplicable 'the techni- 
cal rules of evidence' to the extent provided by paragraph (1) of CPLR 3036."). 
There is an exception for privileged communications. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3 
3036(1) (McKinney 1974). See N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. 3 4501-4506 (McKinney 1963 & 
Supp. 1988); FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, a t  101 (The supporting study of the 
Judicial Conference stated that "all the technical rules of evidence be dispensed with 
except such fundamental rules as the statutory provisions relating to privileged commu- 
nications!'). See generally 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  3 3036.02 
(discussing question of whether the CPLR section 4519 "Dead Man's Statute" is a rule 
relating to privileged communication). 
'O N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R 3 3036(1) (McKinney 1974). Professor Siege1 suggests that 
permitting a judge to summarily curtail the applicability of the SPCDD rules may be one 
of the reasons for the unpopularity of the SPCDD amongst the practicing bar. See note 
165 and accompanying text infra. 
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penses.%l This does not prevent the parties from using their own 
expert witnesses a t  trial.'j2 The court also has the discretion to 
award costs and  disbursement^.^^ A judgment in an SPCDD ac- 
tion is entered and enforced pursuant to the regular provisions 
of the CPLR.B4 
Under the SPCDD, there is an appeal as of right only from 
an order determining the issue of the existence or validity of the 
contract to submit a controversy pursuant to the simplified 
method, or from a final judgrnent.B6 An intermediate order may 
be appealed only with leave of the trial or appellate court;86 
however, review of an intermediate order is preserved and can 
be obtained on appeal from the final j~dgment.~' The standard 
for reviewing factual determinations under the SPCDD is 
whether there was substantial evidence to support the finding.B8 
N.Y. CN. PRAC. L. & R 3 3036(2) (McKinney 1974). See 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & 
MILLER, supra note 29, at  73036.03 ("In complicated or technical disputes, the availabil- 
ity of an impartial expert may assist in simplifying and expediting the trial."). 
a2 3 WEINSTEIN. KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3036.03 ("CPLR 3036(5)(d) 
gives the court the right to limit the number of experts to be heard a t  trial, which pre- 
supposes that the parties have the right to use experts."). 
CPLR section 3036(a) provides that "[c]osts and disbursements in an action 
under the [SPCDD] are matters of judicial discretion and are not to be awarded as a 
matter of course." N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3 3036(a) (McKinney 1974). 3 WEINSTEIN, 
KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3036.11. Presumably sanctions may be awarded 
under CPLR section 8303. See Carlisle, supra note 1, a t  79-82. 
" N.Y. CN. PRAC. L. & R. 3 3036(8) (McKinney 1974) See also 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & 
MILLER, supra note 29, a t  l13035.02 (discussing some of the problems raised in determin- 
ing the details of the procedure to be applied on matters specified in CPLR section 
3036(8)). 
e".Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R 3 3037 ( M c K i e y  1974). 
es Id. "In order to prevent the subversion of the economies in time and expense 
effected by the Simplified Procedure, CPLR 3037 eliminates the right of appeal from an 
intermediate order of the court except with the permission of the court trying the action 
or the appellate court and, thus supersedes CPLR 5701." 3 WEINSTEIN. KORN & MILLER, 
supra note 29, at  IS 3037.01. 
" 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3037.01 (citing N.Y. CIV. PRAC. 
L. & R. f 5501(a) (McKinney 1978)) (scope of review from final judgment); Cohen v. 
Cohen, 3 N.Y.2d 339, 144 N.E.2d 355, 165 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1957)). 
N.Y. CN. PRAC. L. & R. 3 3037 (McKinney 1974) (decision of trial judge on facts 
final if any substantial evidence exists to support it). Thus, the scope of appellate review 
under the SPCDD is the same as judicial review of findings of fact by administrative 
bodies under CPLR section 7803(4). 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 
3037.02. "In ordinary litigation the Appellate Division is free to review questions of law 
and questions of fact. . . . The usual standard on appeal is whether the judgment below 
was against the weight of the evidence . . . and not whether 'there is any substantial 
evidence to support it' as provided in this section." Id. See also D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, 
3 609, a t  876 ("The substantial evidence test of CPLR 7803(4) . . . has been borrowed by 
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New York substantive law governs on appeal, as it does in all 
phases of actions brought under the SPCDD.69 
11. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES AS CONTRASTED 
TO THE SPCCD 
The formality that characterizes court proceedings has led 
to disadvantages prompting some to conclude that courts are not 
the best available forum for the resolution of disputes.?O Thus, 
methods such as arbitration, private trials, negotiated settle- 
ments, mediation, neighborhood justice centers, and mini-trials 
have been suggested as alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
devices.?' 
Both the SPCDD and ADR systems reflect a dissatisfaction 
with the judicial pro~ess,'~ and are designed to dispense low cost 
justice as quickly as possible. Both systems stress inf~rmality?~ 
by limiting or abolishing pretrial di~closure,'~ motion practi~e,'~ 
trial by jury,?B and other technical requirements associated with 
the Simplified Procedure for appellate review of the trial judge's fact findings."). 
ss D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, a t  876. Arbitration differs in this respect. For a discus- 
sion of the rules applicable to arbitration, see notes 81-98 and accompanying text infra. 
See D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, a t  8 609; 0. CHASE, supra note 29, a t  8 23.05. See 
generally 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  I1 3031. 
See notes 15, 17-24 and accompanying text supra. See generally AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOC~ATION, REPORT OF THE ACTION CO~~MISSION T  I~IPROVE THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM 
(Jan. 3, 1987) Appendix D (available in the files of the Brooklyn Law Review) [hereinaf- 
ter ABA REPORT] (describing various forms of alternative dispute resolution). 
'' The imperfections of the judicial process most frequently noted as reasons 
for movement away from the courts are: (1) crowded calendars and attendant 
delay; (2) limitations on the scope of permissible evidence because of the exclu- 
sionary rules applied by the courts; (3) protracted trials; (4) unwanted public- 
ity; (5) harassment of witnesses during cross examination; (6) lack of confi- 
dence in the ability of judges to determine . . . disputes; and (7) high cost of 
counsel fees resulting from the length of the litigation process. 
3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  l13031.01. See also Bellacosa, supra note 
4. 
See GOLDBERG, REEN & SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 189-91, 525-39 and refer- 
ences cited a t  538-39 (1985); Goldstein, supra note 15, a t  76-87. 
?' ABA REPORT, supra note 71. 
Id. 
7s Janofsky, Reducing Court Costs and Delay, 71 ILL. B.J. 94 (Oct. 1982) ("These 
infamous twin evils - delay and cost - contribute to a climate of public cynicism and 
mistrust of the legal profession, the judiciary, and our judicial system."). See also D. 
SIECEL, supra note 29, a t  8 609; 0. CHASE, supra note 29, a t  § 23.05. See generally 3 
WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3036. 
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l i t i ga t i~n .~~  Despite these general similarities, however, signifi- 
cant differences remain between the SPCDD and ADR mecha- 
nisms. Unlike most ADR's, the SPCDD provides for: (1) resolu- 
tion of disputes by a fact-finding judge whose decisions are 
subject to appellate review;78 (2) the application of substantive 
principles of New York law to the pro~eeding;~~ and (3) judicial 
discretion to use other provisions of the CPLR to render speedy 
justice with minimal cost to litigants.80 
A. Arbitration 
Arbitration is among the oldest and most commonly used of 
the ADR methods?* Applicable rules, the selection of arbitra- 
tors, and the binding effect of the proceeding are generally de- 
cided by the parties pursuant to agreement.s2 Typically, each 
side presents evidence and arguments to one or more arbitrators, 
who then render a decision, usually called an "a~ard. '"~ This 
decision need not be based on any particular body of substantive 
law?4 Agreements to arbitrate, as well as arbitral awards, are en- 
forceable in the courts?5 
In some cases, arbitration is required by statute or by rules 
of court.86 For example, in counties subject to the Chief Judge's 
plan under Part 28 of the Rules of Court, claims of under $6000 
must be submitted to arbitration?? Automobile insurance com- 
pany claims for contribution against other insurance companies 
77 D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, a t  $5 586, 609. 
78 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. $ 3037 (McKiney 1974). 
79 D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, 5 609, a t  876. 
3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  § 3036.01. See also Bellacosa, 
supra note 4. See generally note 16 and accompanying text supra. 
81 See JOHNSON. KANTOR & SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, a t  39. See also Hoellering, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and International Trade, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 785; note 17 supra. 
82 Hoellering, supra note 81, a t  785-86. 
83 See Goldstein, supra note 15, a t  76-80. 
8' See 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3031.01. 
Id. See also Goldstein, supra note 15, a t  76-77. See also 9 U.S.C. $ 4 (1982). 
8s See N.Y. INS. LAW $$ 5105(b) and 5106(b) (McKinney 1985); N.Y. LABOR LAW 5 
716(2) (McKinney 1977); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. $5 3405, 7551, and 7556 (McKinney 
Supp. 1988). See also note 15 supra; notes 87-90 and accompanying text infra. 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGS. tit. 22, 5 28.2(b) (1986); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 5 
3405 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (authorizes the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals to 
promulgate rules for the arbitration of money claims of $6000 or less). 
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are also subject to mandatory arbitrati~n:~ as are medical mal- 
practice claims brought by members of health maintenance or- 
ganizations against health care providers.s9 In addition, automo- 
bile insurance claimants can choose arbitration of their no-fault 
claims.90 
Despite the many advantages of arbitration, its deficiencies 
have caused dissatisfaction in some quarters.91 "It is recognized 
. . . that the likelihood of a dispute being settled according to 
generally recognized and predictable rules of substantive law 
. . . is greater when the decision is made by a This 
determination results from the fact that often nonjudicial per- 
sonnel are not sufficiently trained to hear and determine dis- 
p u t e ~ . ~ ~  Moreover, judicial review of decisions reached by arbi- 
tration is highly circumscribed, and courts frequently refuse to 
enjoin arbitrati~n.~' Thus, there is a strong possibility that seri- 
ous errors go uncorre~ted.~~ 
Furthermore, in cases of claims under $6,000, or where auto- 
mobile insurance claimants opt for arbitration, the parties are 
afforded a full opportunity for trial de ~ o v o . ~ ~  The same holds 
true if the arbitration is otherwise n~nbinding.~? In such cases, 
either side can choose to litigate the entire action in court after 
the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings. This results in 
substantial duplication of effort. 
By contrast, the SPCDD provides for judicial decisions on 
New York law that are subject to appellate review, yet made on 
a less formal basis.9s There is no duplication of effort, and less 
uncertainty about results. Moreover, errors of fact and law are 
more likely to be corrected. Thus, the SPCDD retains many of 
" N.Y. INS. LAW 5105(b) (McKinney 1985). 
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. $8 7551, 7556 (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
N.Y. INS. LAW 5106(b) (McKinney 1985). 
" See 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, at ll 3031.01. 
O2 Id. 
O3 Id. 
O4 Id. 
Id. 
O0 N.Y. CN. PRAC. L. & R § 3405 (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 22, § 28.12 (1986) (claims under $6,000); N.Y. INS. LAW 5106(b) (McKinney 
1985) (arbitration of no-fault claims at option of insured). 
N.Y. CN. Pmc. L. & R § 3405 (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, at § 609. 
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arbitration's advantages, while avoiding its pitfalls.99 
B. Administrative Proceedings 
There is great emphasis today on resolving disputes by ad- 
ministrative adjudicati~n.'~~ Commentators agree, however, that 
there are four basic problems with the administrative determi- 
nation of disputes.lol 
First, there is a conflict of interest problem. It is frequently 
difficult to combine the investigating, litigating, rulemaking, and 
adjudicating functions of an agency with the goals of assuring 
fairness and impartiality to all parties.'02 The system of internal 
separation of agency functions has always been viewed with 
great suspicion by the private bar:'03 
Many hearing officers and administrative law judges are employed by 
the same agencies that promulgate the regulations that these officials 
are supposed to be applying in an impartial manner. Unlike judicial 
forums, agencies have tasks other than resolving judicial disputes. 
Thus, agency determinations are influenced by the policies, aims, per- 
sonalities, and sources of power sustaining the agency.lM 
Second, administrative tribunals follow differing rules of 
procedure.106 Also, it is frequently difficult to differentiate be- 
tween rule-making and adjudicative determinations.'06 Although 
both the state and federal administrative procedure acts were 
designed to create uniform rules of procedure for administrative 
bodies, uniformity has not occurred in actual practice.'07 The 
federal act, passed in 1946,'08 has been altered indirectly by 
changes in substantive law and in agency enabling acts.'09 The 
See 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, at ll 3031. 
loo See Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111, 114, 118-19 
(1976). 
'01 See Breger, supra note 18, at 338. 
Io2 Id. at 352-53. 
'03 Id. at 352. 
l M  Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of Issue 
Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court of 
Law?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 87-88 (1986). 
lo" See Breger, supra note 18, at 344-45; Carlisle, supra note 104, at 85-87. 
loB Carlisle, supra note 104, at 94 n.198. 
Io7 See Breger, supra note 18, at 344-45. 
Io8 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
$3 551-559, 701-706 (1982)). 
108 See Breger, supra note 18, at 343-45. 
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state statute, which became effective in 1976,11° does not provide 
consistent procedures for all administrative adjudication.lll For 
example, the state statute is inapplicable to the State Insurance 
Fund and the Workmen's Compensation Board,l12 two adminis- 
trative agencies that have displaced court determination of 
disputes.l13 
A third problem is that neither the federal nor the state ad- 
ministrative procedure act guarantees litigants access to pretrial 
dis~losure.~~' Similarly, administrative tribunals are not bound 
by the rules of evidence.l16 
The fourth and final problem is that agencies that follow 
formal adjudicative procedures to administer benefit, entitle- 
ment, and other compensation programs have experienced a vast 
increase in ~aseloads."~ Thus, it seems virtually impossible to 
use the administrative process to resolve essentially private dis- 
putes without expanding an already vast bureaucratic structure. 
These problems suggest that the substitution of administra- 
tive determinations for judicial decisions will only duplicate 
functions that should be performed by courts, making today's 
overloaded court system tomorrow's overworked administrative 
agency.l17 Moreover, since most administrative proceedings are 
subject to judicial review,lls the appellate process will remain 
backlogged. Viewed in this light, the administrative process will 
play a role in solving disputes involving the government and 
other areas of substantial public interest, but not in the resolu- 
tion of essentially private disputes. 
Unlike administrative adjudication, the SPCDD works well 
for private disputes. The SPCDD works within the court system, 
rather than duplicating it, and streamlines the complex litiga- 
I1O Ch. 167 [I9751 N.Y. Laws 226 (McKinney). 
N.Y. A.P.A. LAW 3 305 (McKinney 1984). See also Carlisle, supra note 104, at 95 
n.198. 
112 N.Y. A.P.A. LAW $ 102(1) (McKinney 1984). 
Il3 Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276 (1982). 
Carlisle, supra note 104, at 86. 
ll8 Id. at 87. 
See Breger, supra note 18, at 353. 
See Resnick, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL . REV. 603, 620 (1985). Resnick 
reveals that, "[i]nvestigations of  agencies, such as the New York Human Rights Division 
and the Social Security Administration, reveal inadequate processes, erratic decision- 
making, lack of  resources, and administrative malfunctioning." Id. 
118 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R 3s 7803, 7804 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1988). 
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tion and trial processes that are the main cause of congestion 
within our courts.119 
C. Private Trials 
One of the more innovative ADR techniques is the private 
trial. This form of dispute resolution combines many of the as- 
pects of a public trial with certain aspects of arbitration. As in 
arbitration, parties to a private trial must agree on whether the 
procedure will be binding.120 In most other respects, the private 
trial is similar to a public trial, with a few important exceptions. 
The private trial is conducted by nongovernmental entities, 
and the proceedings are closed to the public unless the parties 
agree to have them open.121 Decisions are made by retired judges 
who apply principles of substantive law as they would in a pub- 
lic trial.122 These decisions are appealable to a three judge appel- 
late review ~ a n e 1 . l ~ ~  Certain procedural rules, such as those in- 
volving discovery, are the same as in a public trial.12( Simplified 
rules of evidence allow for the presentation of witness testimony 
in written documentary form, and the introduction of bills and 
other financial documents without need for authentication or 
identification. Motion practice is limited to purely essential 
matters.126 
The private trial mode of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
has been severely criticized as highly duplicative of court pro- 
ceedings, and, in effect, creating a private court system available 
only to those with adequate financial Its opponents 
also fear that procedural guidelines will be ignored and, as a re- 
sult, fairness to litigants will be compr~mised.'~~ Moreover, the 
proceedings are usually closed, and thus not subject to public 
See notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra (for a discussion of the merits of 
the SPCDD). 
lZ0 See Castro, supra note 23, at 64. 
121 De Sando, supra note 23, at Al, col. 1. 
lz2 Tolchin, supra note 23, at 38, cols. 1-4. 
123 DeSando, supra note 23, at A2, col. 4. 
Iz4 See JUDICATE, INC., JUDICATE RULES OF PROCEDURE (1984) (available in the files of 
the Brooklyn Law Review). See also Tolchin, supra note 23. 
lZ6 See JUDICATE RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 124 (Rule 13 states that "motion 
practice shall be limited to those matters absolutely necessary to a final resolution of the 
issues and not determined during the initial prehearing conference."). 
lZ6 See Tolchin, supra note 23, at 38. 
lZ7 Id. 
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Technical problems in the private trial method of 
dispute resolution include the lack of compulsory powers over 
third parties,12B and, as with other ADR systems, the fact that 
litigants must resort to public courts for enforcement of 
decisions.130 
The SPCDD has the advantages of the private trial without 
sharing its problems. For example, the SPCDD eliminates bur- 
densome and unnecessary disclosure and motion practice with- 
out depriving the litigants of third party practice or their right 
of access to the courts.131 
D. Summary Jury Trial 
A summary jury trial is a nonbinding procedure in which 
both parties present arguments to a jury of 1 a ~ m e n . l ~ ~  The jury's 
determination highlights the strong and weak points of each 
party's case and thereby encourages settlement. No witnesses 
testify; a summary of their testimony and all other evidence is 
presented to the jury in the form of documents, depositions, 
stipulations, and affidavits by the lawyers for each party. The 
advantage of this method is that a summary jury trial can com- 
press a long, protracted trial into a very short 
This procedure, however, has numerous disadvantages. For 
one, the procedure is nonbinding. Second, the procedure re- 
quires more preparation by counsel than is required for a con- 
ventional trial,13' which may actually frustrate ~ett1ement.l~~ A 
third disadvantage is that the summary jury trial impedes the 
jury's ability to make a decision based upon due deliberation, for 
the jury is bombarded with voluminous amounts of information 
in a very short period of tirne.l3= Fourth, a primary function per- 
IZS Id. 
I t  is, after all, a private court. See DeSando, supra note 23, a t  Al, col. 1. 
Id. 
See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3 3031 (McKinney 1974). See also notes 70-80 and 
accompanying text supra. See also note 261 infra. 
Wilkinson, supra note 19, a t  1, cols. 3-4. 
133 Id. 
15' Id. a t  5, col. 1. 
l3& Id. 
136 Id. The jury may be overwhelmed especially where complex issues and many 
parties are involved. In addition, "[ilf one believes that jurors' views evolve over time 
during a full-scale trial of a complex case, then one must be dubious, a t  best, about the 
fundamental premise on which a [summary jury trial] is based, i.e., the notion that a 
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formed by a jury is to evaluate the witnesses' testimony.13' The 
elimination of this live testimony in favor of summary testimony 
submitted by the attorneys defeats this primary role and tends 
to underplay the role of witnesses and the facts of the case and 
to overvalue the dramatics and theatrics of the 1 a ~ y e r s . l ~ ~  
The summary jury trial procedure resembles the medical 
malpractice panel, in which arguments by attorneys are 
presented to a panel, consisting of a physician, a lawyer, and a 
judge, which makes a nonbinding determination as to the liabil- 
ity of the defendant.139 The panel's findings can be introduced 
into evidence if the case goes to trial.140 In theory, it  was be- 
lieved that the medical malpractice panel procedure would en- 
courage settlement and reduce the number of trials."' In prac- 
tice, however, these panels have tended to hinder rather than 
accelerate case disp~sition."~ Thus, the summary jury trial is 
likely to be a costly, time-consuming, and ineffective method of 
passing splash of information can somehow be equated with a full length trial of difficult 
issues." Id. 
13' See Hart, Shall the Jury System be Sacrificed on the Altar of Economy?, 27-28 
N.Y. ST. B. BULL. 146, 148 (1956). 
138 See Wilkinson, supra note 19. In the average lengthy trial, the jury gradually 
disregards the theatrics of lawyers and in exchange properly emphasizes the facts and 
the witnesses. This is impossible in the summary jury trial. Id. 
The summary jury trial procedures resembles the medical malpractice panel, an- 
other innovative technique used to avoid long, inefficient trials. Many of the disadvan- 
tages inherent in these panels are also found in the summary jury trial procedure. 
In medical malpractice panels, attorney's arguments are presented to a panel con- 
sisting of a physician, a lawyer, and a judge. The panel makes a non-binding determina- 
tion as to the liability of the defendant. See N.Y. JUD. LAW $8 148-(a)(2) & 148-(a)@) 
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988). See also Sohn, Examination of Alternatives to Suit in 
Doctor-Patient Disputes, 48 ALB. L. REV. 669, 681 (1981). If the case proceeds to trial, 
the panels' findings can be introduced in evidence. N.Y. JUD. LAW 8 148-(a)@) (McKin- 
ney 1983 & Supp. 1988). See also Sohn, supra, a t  683. If not, the panel determination is 
used to expedite settlement by using the panel's recommendation as leverage in the ne- 
gotiation. Because the summary jury trial closely resembles the medical malpractice 
panel, it can be expected to share its problems. 
140 N.Y. JUD. LAW 5 148-a(8) (McKinney 1983). See also Sohn, supra note 139. 
141 Sohn, supra note 139, at  683-84. 
14' Id. a t  684. The use of panels has slowed down the disposition of cases because 
very often i t  results in two trials - one before the panel and one before the court. A trial 
before a court is often demanded because "plaintiffs who have received a unanimous 
panel recommendation have been notorious in demanding extremely high settlements 
and in proceeding to trial with increased determination to carry the case to verdict or 
costly settlement." Id. a t  684 (quoting N.Y. Times, Feb. 27,1983, 8 1, a t  40, col. 3). Thus, 
the parties must bear the expenses of two trials instead of just one. 
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dispute resolution as compared to the SPCDD.Iq3 
E. Mini-Trials 
The mini-trial is a mediation technique designed to bring 
about a settlement between the parties. Both parties attend a 
conference before an impartial third party, called an advisor."' 
After hearing presentations from both sides, the advisor assists 
the parties in formulating a voluntary settlement to the dispute. 
The procedure is typically used in corporate and commercial 
disputes, with executives from both sides present.lq6 
The chief disadvantage of a mini-trial is that the settlement 
reached is nonbinding.lq6 The chief advantage, however, is that a 
mini-trial is a very simple and informal procedure, only slightly 
more cumbersome than an ordinary settlement conference.lq7 
Thus, the procedure would be highly compatible with the 
SPCDD, particularly under the US system.148 For example, the 
court could first refer the parties to a neutral advisor for a mini- 
trial, or could structure settlement conferences to incorporate 
features of the mini-trials, thereby making the mini-trial a via- 
ble part of the SPCDD process rather than just another non- 
binding ADR technique. 
F .  Community Dispute Resolution Centers 
The Community Dispute Resolution system is an innovative 
and popular mediation technique. This system is a voluntary 
process whereby both parties meet with a neutral mediator, and 
together attempt to fashion an acceptable resolution for their 
disp~te."~ Most of the disputes handled by the centers are re- 
''= N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R $$ 3033, 3036(8) (McKinney 1974). 
14' See Dalton, supra note 20, a t  7, col. 1. 
Id. 
See Burger, supra note 113, a t  277. Chief Justice Burger suggests that when non- 
binding procedures are used, sanctions should be imposed to discourage litigants from 
taking the case further without sanctions, non-binding mediation techniques tend to be 
ineffective. Id. 
14' See Dalton, supra note 20, a t  7, col. 1. 
See test accompanying notes 243-51 infra. 
14@ See Christian, supra note 24, a t  772. The Community Dispute Resolution Cen- 
ters Program (CDRCP) was created in 1981 under the direction of the Office of Court 
Administration of the Unified Court System of the State of New York. Id. (citing N.Y. 
JUD. LAW 8 849-b (McKinney Supp. 1988)). 
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ferred by courts and public agencies.lS0 The disputes customarily 
involve minor civil, criminal, and family matters that do not 
need formal adjudicati~n.'~~ Examples include small claims, con- 
sumer-merchant disputes, simple assault, and certain domestic 
violence matters.lS2 While these centers perform a valuable so- 
cial service, they are designed to handle a small and very specific 
class of disputes that typically do not end up in full-blown liti- 
gation. Thus, the existence of these centers is not likely to allevi- 
ate court congestion. By contrast, the SPCDD is designed to re- 
solve disputes that require formal adjudication. 
G. Trial by Referee 
Article 43 of the CPLR permits a judge to refer a case for 
trial before a referee.lS3 The referee decides only those matters 
the court instructs him to decide, in their order of reference.15' 
The court can limit the referee's power by limiting the order of 
reference. This greatly limits the utility of trial by referee as an 
ADR technique, as some matters will likely be tried to the refe- 
ree, while others will be tried by the court or jury. This also cre- 
ates the potential for duplication of judicial effort. Moreover, 
under ordinary circumstances, the cost of the referee must be 
borne by the parties, thus adding cost to the dispute resolution 
p r o ~ e ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~  
A trial by referee with a sufEciently broad order of refer- 
ence, however, would be highly compatible with the SPCDD, 
and would conserve judicial resources. For example, simple ac- 
tions under the SPCDD could be tried by a referee, while more 
complex cases could be tried by a judge. Similarly, a- trial by 
referee could be used to narrow the issues to be tried by the 
judge in the SPCDD action, also reducing court time. 
Is0 Id. at 772. 
Is' Id. at 771. 
Is2 See generally id. 
Is3 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. $3 4301-4321 (McKinney 1963). 
Is4 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3 4311 (McKinney 1963). See also L.H. Feder Corp. v. 
Bozkurtian, 48 A.D.2d 701, 368 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't 1975) (referee may not decide 
issues not before him in the order of reference). 
m5 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3 4321 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1988). The only excep- 
tion is when the referee is a judicial hearing officer. In that case, his compensation is 
determined pursuant to the Judiciary Law. See N.Y. JUD. Law 852 (McKinney Supp. 
1988). 
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111. WHY LAWYERS HAVE NOT USED THE SPCDD 
In view of the high volume of cases filed in the trial courts 
of the Unified Court System of New Y ~ r k , ' ~ ~  it would appear 
that the SPCDD is underutilized. For example, almost one- 
third, or 1,021,218, of the cases filed in New York in 1987 were 
in civil The number of civil cases disposed of in 1987 
totaled 952,354.168 Included in these dispositions were 12,220 
civil-case trials brought in the supreme court. Of this number, 
56% were tried by a judge.169 Similarly, although thirty-one 
counties operate a mandatory arbitration program for cases in- 
volving claimed damages of $6,000 or less, only 12,473 cases were 
received for arbitration in 1987.1e0 Of the cases disposed of in 
the arbitration program, there were 1,607 demands for trial de 
nouo.lel Cases received under the Community Dispute Resolu- 
tion Centers Program in 1987 totaled 101,851, but only 19,801 of 
these cases were disposed of.le2 These statistics, and the sparse 
case law generated under the SPCDD, indicate a general reluc- 
tance by the bar to take advantage of New York's simplified 
procedure.le3 
Many reasons exist for the underutilization of the SPCDD. 
Obviously, some members of the bar are not aware of its exis- 
tence,le4 while others are wary of the judge's discretionary pow- 
ers under the SPCDD.le6 Also, lawyers generally dislike surren- 
Is8 During 1987, there were 3,581,911 filings in the trial courts of the Unified Court 
System, including 886,614 parking tickets. Of the 2,695,297 remaining cases, 41% 
(1,113,752) were filed in criminal courts, 38% (1,021,218) in civil courts, 16% (439,130) in 
the Family Courts and 5% (121,197) in the Surrogates' Courts. CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR'S 
REPORT. supra note 5, a t  2-1. 
Is' Tort actions, including medical malpractice, accounted for 58% of the civil filings 
in the supreme court. Id. a t  2-11. Statewide 180,110 new civil cases were filed in the 
supreme court. Id. a t  2-10. In the Civil Court of the City of New York there were 252,475 
civil action summonses filed in 1987. Id. a t  2-15. For landlordltenant calendars, 336,191 
notices of petition were issued in summary proceedings. Id. The remainder of civil cases 
were filed in city and district courts outside New York City and in county courts and the 
court of claims. Id. a t  2-2. 
lss Id. 
Id. a t  2-11. 
lea Id. at  2-16. 
Id. 
16* Id. a t  2-26. 
Ie3 See D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, 5 609, a t  874. 
Is' Id. 
leS Id. Professor Siege1 suggests that one of the factors accountable for the unpopu- 
larity of the SPCDD is that CPLR section 3036(1) states that the "rules . . . of proce- 
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dering their right to pre-trial disclosure166 and to trial by jury.167 
Finally, some decisional law has been interpreted to suggest that 
the SPCDD is not applicable to tort actions.16* Each of these 
impediments to the expanded use of the SPCDD is worthy of 
analysis. 
A. Pretrial Disclosure 
The benefits of pretrial disclosure under Article 31 of the 
CPLRle9 are well known; it encourages settlements and usually 
improves the efficiency of a trial or hearing and the quality of a 
court decision.170 Yet extensive disclosure is not necessary for 
most civil cases.171 The high cost of discovery and discovery 
abuses with their attendant delay have prompted great concern 
among the bar, the judiciary, and the 1egi~lature.l~~ 
CPLR 3126, and the recently amended CPLR 8303-a, were 
dure shall be dispensed with," but adds, "unless the court shall otherwise direct." Id. 
(citing N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3 3036(1) (McKinney 1974)). However, another distin- 
guished commentator argues that this section is beneficial to the purposes of the SPCDD 
because i t  permits the trial judge to maintain control over the procedure. See Goldstein, 
supra note 15, a t  85 n.58 (citing De Benedictis Rules Restricting Civil Procedures Takes 
Effect Friday, L.A. Daily J., June 27,1983, a t  1, col. 6). See also notes 212-15 and accom- 
panying text infra. 
lee See notes 169-81 and accompanying text infra. 
Iu7 See notes 182-92 and accompanying text infra. 
lg8 See N.Y. Kandy Kard Corp. v. Bartons Candy Corp., 32 A.D.2d 513, 298 
N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st Dep't 1969); notes 200-04 and accompanying text infra. See also 3 
WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3033.01. Provisions requiring submission 
of disputes under the SPCDD have also been utilized in separation agreements, see, e.g., 
Hunter v. Hunter, 57 A.D.2d 797,394 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1st Dep't 1977); Kleiner v. Sanjenis, 
46 A.D.2d 617,359 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1st Dep't 1974); Goldenberg v. Goldenberg, 25 A.D.2d 
670, 268 N.Y.S.2d 383 (2d Dep't 1966), as well as various types of community contracts, 
e.g., Castagna & Son Inc. v. Alan Michel Plumbing, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 841,462 N.E.2d 139, 
473 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1984) (construction contract); Hurlbut v. Christiano, 63 A.D.2d 1116, 
405 N.Y.S.2d 871 (4th Dep't 1978) (contract to purchase a nursing home); Freund v. 
Washington Square Press, Inc., 41 A.D.2d 371, 343 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1st Dep't 19731, rev'd 
on other grounds, 34 N.Y.2d 379, 357 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1974) (contract to publish a book). 
See also supra note 30. 
IBs N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R $3 3101-40 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988). 
See 0. CHASE, supra note 41, a t  3 20.01; see generally D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, 
at  3 343. 
17' See Green, Marks & Olsen, supra note 16, a t  501-11; see also Note, California's 
Pilot Project in Economical Litigation, 53 So. CAL. L. REV. 1497, 1502 & n.98 (1980). 
See D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, 3 367, a t  465. "The present system . . . is too 
tolerant of the deliberately evasive and dilatory litigant, increasing the expense of litiga- 
tion in money, time, trouble, and feeling, and, consequently, helping to undermine public 
confidence in the courts." Id. 
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enacted to minimize abusive pre-trial  practice^.'^^ Similarly, the 
New York Uniform Rules of the Court174 which govern the new 
Individual Assignment System176 were designed, in part, to re- 
quire judges to exercise more supervisory control over discov- 
e r ~ . ' ~ ~  Consequently, many of the tactical advantages and litiga- 
tion strategies long associated with pretrial disclosure no longer 
apply and thus should no longer dissuade lawyers from using the 
SPCDD. Also, under the SPCDD, a judge can order whatever 
disclosure he deems necessary.177 
In addition, the SPCDD assures that attorneys' fees and 
discovery costs will not prohibit plaintiffs from making use of 
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. $ 3126 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1988). This provision 
states in pertinent part: 
If any party, or a person who a t  the time a deposition is taken or an examina- 
tion or inspection is made, . . . refuses to obey an order for disclosure or 
wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been 
disclosed, . . . the court may make such orders with regard to the failure or 
refusal as are just . . . . 
Id. 
See also N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted by Ch. 
220, 35, [I9861 N.Y. Laws 386 (McKinney). For a discussion of the new law, see Car- 
lisle, supra note l, a t  67. 
17' The New York Uniform Rules incorporate the individual assignment system. Ef- 
fective 1986, these rules are codified in various sections of title 22 of the New York Com- 
pilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 22 $ 202 
(1986). See also Fox, Comment on McLoughlin v. Henke, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1986, a t  1, 
col. 3. 
See The Individual Assignment System, supra note 1 (describing the IAS sys- 
tem in the county and supreme courts); The Uniform Rules Take Effect, Part 11: Papers 
and hfotion Practice, 313 N.Y. ST. L. DIG. 1, 1-3 (Jan. 1986) (describing how to file pa- 
pers in court and how motion practice is accomplished under the IAS system); The Uni- 
form Rules Take Effect, Part 111: The Preliminary Conference, 314 N.Y. ST. L. DIG. 1, 1- 
3 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter The Preliminary Conference] (describing the required prelim- 
inary conference under the IAS system); The Uniform Rules Take Effect, Part IV: A 
Brief Overview and a Few Observations, 315 N.Y. ST. L. DIG. 1 , l -3  (Mar. 1986) (describ- 
ing in detail a number of rules under the IAS system). See also notes 237-50 and accom- 
panying text infra. See generally Brodsky, supra note 1, a t  288-90 (how motion practice 
is changed under the IAS system). 
176 See Uniform Rule 202.12(g), which states in material part: 
In the discretion of the court, failure of a party to comply with the order or 
transcript resulting from the preliminary conference, or the making of unnec- 
essary or frivolous motions by a party, shall result in the imposition upon such 
party of costs or such other sanctions as are authorized by law. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 $ 202.12(g) (1986). See also Lawyer in Case under IAS 
Penalized for Delay of Trial, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1986, a t  1, col. 3 (lawyer penalized by 
judge for failure to comply with the "new rules of the game" under individual assign- 
ment system). 
See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. $ 3036(1) (McKinney 1979). See also note 165 supra. 
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the courts.1Ts Similarly, the SPCDD guarantees defendants that 
disclosure will not be utilized to extract substantial settlements 
by forcing them to consent to a disposition solely to avoid years 
of litigation.lT9 Under the SPCDD, disputes can be resolved with 
or without disclosure, depending upon the type of case and the 
necessity to formulate issues for trial by a judge.lS0 Furthermore, 
the SPCDD is particularly useful under the new Individual As- 
signment System where one judge handles a case from beginning 
to end.lsl 
B. Trial By Judge 
Approximately fifty-six percent of all civil supreme court 
trials in New York are nonjury trials.lS2 This reflects a long- 
standing realization by the bar that experienced fact-finding 
judges often render better decisions than juries.lss The principal 
function of a jury is to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and 
attempt to reach a decision based on which witnesses the jury 
believes are telling the truth. The jury then renders its verdict in 
accordance with instructions from the court. Neither the jury, in 
rendering its verdict, nor a judge, when rendering a decision in a 
bench trial, pretends to know what actually happened at  the 
time of the incident upon which the cause of action is predi- 
cated. An experienced judge, however, can resolve most disputed 
17$ See Loggins, How the Plaintiff's Counsel Views ELP, 20 JUDGES J. 11 (1981). 
The SPCDD in New York closely resembles the simplified procedure enacted by the 
California courts. The Economical Litigation Program (ELP) has demonstrated that 
minimizing pleadings and discovery reduces the time an attorney spends on each indi- 
vidual case, thereby reducing attorney costs. Id. Similarly, CPLR section 3031 limits 
pleadings, and CPLR section 3036(5) limits disclosure. Thus, New York can expect the 
positive results experienced by the California courts. N.Y. CIV. PMC. L. & R. $is 3031, 
3036(5) (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1988). See also notes 251-55 and accompanying text 
infra. 
Disclosure is limited by the judge, thus defendant's interests are protected from 
discovery abuses by plaintiff. See N.Y. CN. PRAC. L. & R. $ 3036(5). 
See note 177 and accompanying text supra. 
18' See notes 237-50 and accompanying text infra. 
See CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR'S EPORT, supra note 5, a t  2-11. 
lS3 See generally 8. BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 1, 142 (1952 & reprint 1974) (two distin- 
guished jurists recognize that overall there is no reason to believe that determinations 
made by judges would be any different from those made by juries); Foster, Jury Trial on 
Trial - A Symposium, 28 N.Y. ST. B. BULL. 322 (Oct. 1956); Peck, Report on Justice, 25 
N.Y. ST. B. BULL. 107, 116-18 (Apr. 1953). 
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issues of fact as well as a jury.lB4 Also, under the SPCDD, a 
judge is permitted to seek the assistance of an impartial court- 
appointed expert to aid in the analysis of unusual facts.lB5 
Proponents of trial by jury agree that having a jury in the 
offing serves three purposes: (1) as a threat of an immediate jury 
trial against a plaintiff who wants too much, or against a defend- 
ant who won't pay enough, or perhaps against both;ls6 (2) for 
counsel who has a poor case but believes he can persuade a jury 
to decide for his client;lB7 and (3) assuming liability is estab- 
lished against the defendant, a jury is more likely to award the 
plaintiff a larger monetary amount than a judge.lBs These argu- 
ments in favor of trial by jury have not been embraced by the 
plaintiffs' or defendants' bar in jurisdictions where simplified 
procedures similar to the SPCDD are used.ls9 These arguments 
are of even less concern to the plaintiffs' bar under the new IAS 
because one judge has a case from beginning to end.lgO Once a 
request for judicial intervention is filedlgl and the case is as- 
signed to a particular judge, both parties will be in a position to 
weigh the potential benefits of a trial by jury against the advan- 
Is' See Peck, supra note 183, a t  117. 
lss See N.Y. CIV. Pruc. L. & R. 3 3036(2) (McKinney 1974); 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & 
MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3036.03. See also note 61 and accompanying text supra. 
"s Foster, supra note 183, a t  323. 
IS' Id. 
Is8 See generally, Glaser, Damages Update - 1986, 18 TRIAL .Q. 16 (1987). 
Is* See Loggins, supra note 178, a t  11; see also Mercy, How the Defense Counsel 
Vieurs ELP, 20 JUDGES J. 12 (1981) (overall, they have been pleased with the results of 
simplified procedures). In these jurisdictions using simplified procedures, attorneys have 
found that non-productive court time is avoided by placing limits on discovery and the 
disallowance of demurrers to complaints. In addition, because recovery amounts are lim- 
ited, plaintiffs are not likely to make excessive payment demands on defendants. Fur- 
ther, the work required to prepare a case under the simplified procedure is considerably 
less than that required for a full trial. Id. 
See notes 230-45 and accompanying text infra. 
I@' A Request for Judicial Intervention (RJI) is governed by Rule 202.6 of the Uni- 
form Rules. Rule 202.6 requires that if a judge has not already been assigned to the case, 
an RJI must accompany any of the following: (1) a notice of motion; (2) an order to show 
cause; (3) an application for an ex parte order; (4)  a notice of petition; (5) a note of issue; 
(6) a notice of medical or dental malpractice; (7) a statement of net worth as required by 
Domestic Relations Law section 236 for matrimonial actions; or (8) a request for the 
assignment of an action to a judge and a preliminary conference. The filing of the RJI 
gets the case assigned to a judge who supervises the case thereafter until the termination 
of the case. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.3(b) (1986). See generally 
The Individual Assignment System, supra note 1. 
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tages of the SPCDD.lS2 Hence, judicial familiarity with the facts 
and issues of a particular type of case, and the judge's ability to 
give issues measured consideration, may be more readily accom- 
plished under the SPCDD. The third objection to the SPCDD, 
that juries render larger damage awards than judges, lacks merit 
because most cases under the SPCDD will have a value of less 
than $100,000.1s3 In any event, run-away jury damage awards are 
usually reduced by appellate courts.1s4 In light of the advantages 
of a trial by judge, the lawyers' hesitancy to utilize SPCDD is 
misplaced. 
C. Tort Cases 
The majority of the civil cases filed in New York State 
courts are tort actions,lS6 yet there is a widespread misunder- 
standing by the trial bar that the SPCDD cannot be used for 
these cases.lg6 This misunderstanding stems from the bar's gen- 
eral unfamiliarity with the SPCDD, as well as case law sug- 
gesting that the SPCDD cannot be used for tort claims.197 The 
sole case addressing the applicability of the SPCDD to tort 
claims is New York Kandy Kurd Corp. v. Barton's Candy 
C ~ r p . ' ~ ~  where, shortly after the adoption of the CPLR,'ee the 
lgZ See 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  11 3031. Both parties must 
consent to the use of SPCDD. One party cannot unilaterally decide to submit the case to 
the court under SPCDD. Id. a t  ll 3031.03. Under the former Master Calendar System it 
was difficult, if not impossible, to know which judge would be assigned to a case under 
the SPCDD. Similarly, once the case was assigned to a judge, it was not clear if it would 
remain with this judge through trial or be reassigned. See also notes 230-36 and accom- 
panying text infra. 
lg3 See Foster, supra note 183, a t  326 (juries do not necessarily render larger dam- 
age awards than judges). 
la' See, e.g., Vialva v. New York, 118 A.D.2d 710,499 N.Y.S.2d 977 (2d Dep't 1986) 
(verdict of $400,000 for conscious pain and suffering reduced to $100,000); Jandt v. 
Abele, 116 A.D.2d 699,498 N.Y.S.2d 17 (2d Dep't 1986) ($100,000 jury verdict reduced to 
$65,000); Korman v. Pub. Serv. Truck Renting, Inc., 116 A.D.2d 631, 497 N.Y.S.2d 480 
(2d Dep't 1986) ($1,500,000 jury verdict reduced to $200,000); Morales v. New York, 115 
A.D.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1st Dep't 1985) ($425,000 jury verdict for wrongful death 
and conscious pain and suffering reduced to $200,000). 
lgS See CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR'S EPORT, supra note 5, a t  2-11 (tort actions ac- 
counted for 58% of the civil cases filed in 1987). 
lg6 See note 168 and accompanying text supra. 
lg7 See notes 156-68 and accompanying text supra. 
lg8 32 A.D.2d 513, 298 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st Dep't 1969). 
lgs The CPLR was adopted in 1962 and became effective September 1, 1963. Ch. 
308, [I9621 N.Y. Laws 593 (McKinney). These laws repealed and replaced the Civil Prac- 
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Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department held that 
issues soundjng in tort did not come under the clause of a con- 
tract agreed to by the parties, providing for the use of simplified 
procedure.200 
Kandy Kard involved a contract between two parties that 
provided for the use of the SPCDD "as to any controversy aris- 
ing thereunder."201 An action arose sounding both in tort and 
breach of contract. The appellate division did not permit the is- 
sues to be disposed of pursuant to the SPCDD, holding that the 
parties did not intend the issue involving tort law to be decided 
under the contractual clause providing for the simplified proce- 
The appellate division based its decision on its observa- 
tion that "it would be wasteful, inefficient, and, indeed a compli- 
cated rather than a simple procedure to try [the tort] issue alone 
and resort to simplified procedures for the issue of breach of 
contract."203 Consequently, both the tort and breach of contract 
issues were disposed of pursuant to full litigation  procedure^.^^ 
The Kandy Kard decision, which has not been interpreted 
or applied by any other New York court,205 should be limited to 
its particular facts. A review of the legislative history reveals 
that there is no question that the legislature intended the 
SPCDD to apply to tort cases.208 The SPCDD would be particu- 
larly useful in automobile accident cases, which comprise a sig- 
nificant number of the total civil cases filed each year,207 for 
many of these cases require little pre-trial disclosure. Also, a 
judge could conduct the trial faster than, and as fairly as, a 
tice Act and Rules of Civil Practice. See note 32 supra. 
Kandy Kard, 32 A.D.2d a t  514, 258 N.Y.S.2d a t  564. See also N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. 
& R. $3 3031-3037 (McKinney 1974). 
Kandy Kard, 32 A.D.2d a t  514, 258 N.Y.S.2d a t  564. 
loZ Id. 
=03 Id. 
Id. 
lo6 See 3 \VEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3036. 
?OB See FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, a t  103 ("There is no reason why this 
procedure [SPCDD] should not be available to any parties who feel they would like to 
use it, in any type case, even in negligence actions."); see also D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, $ 
609, at  876 (1978) ("[The SPCDD] is apparently available for any subject matter, includ- 
ing tort. . . ." [citation omitted]); 0. CHASE, supra note 29, $ 230.05, a t  904 ("Any justi- 
ciable controversy, regardless of subject matter, may be submitted to the court under the 
Simplified Procedure, but only if both sides agree."). 
' 07  King, Constitutionality of No Fault Jurisprudence, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 797 
(1983). 
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jury.208 The time saved by not impaneling a jury and by bypas- 
sing technical rules of evidence, bench conferences, and jury 
summations and instructions would cut a significant amount of 
trial time.20B Similarly, under the SPCDD, the prospects of an 
immediate trial would generate settlements in these negligence 
cases at an earlier date with less cost to the parties and to the 
court system.210 
D. Judicial Discretion 
CPLR section 3036(1) of the SPCDD states that the rules of 
procedure "shall be dispensed with" but then adds, "unless the 
court shall otherwise direct."211 This section thereby permits a 
judge, without explanation, "to cancel out summarily the sole 
advantage of the Simplified Pr~cedure."~'~ Professor David 
Siege1 suggests that "the very existence of this power may be 
one of the factors accountable for the unpopularity of the Sim- 
plified P r o ~ e d u r e . " ~ ~ ~  He argues, in effect, that there is no guar- 
antee that parties stipulating to use of the SPCDD can rely on 
its use.214 Other commentators believe that CPLR 3036(1) 
merely gives a judge the flexibility to assure that the legislative 
intent of the SPCDD is implemented, while permitting resort to 
the normal rules of procedure in cases where it would be 
helpful.216 
Professor Siegel's concern may be applicable to matters that. 
could otherwise be submitted to arbitration,21e because if two 
parties agree to present an arbitral matter to the SPCDD, they 
do not want a judge to change their intent. Professor Siegel's 
208 See notes 183-93 accompanying text supra. 
See Epstein, Reducing Litigation Costs for Small Cases, 20 JUDGES J. 9, 65 
(1981). See also ABA REPORT, supra note 71  (section G and Appendix C relating to  
Maricopa County, Arizona Fast Track System). 
*lo See Epstein, supra note 209, at  66. In his evaluation o f  California's project for 
economical litigation, Epstein comments that "there is nothing more conducive t o  a set- 
tlement than the certainty that i f  there is no settlement, there will be trial within a short 
and specified number o f  days." Id. 
211 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 8 3036(1) (McKinney 1974). See generally notes 58-64 
and accompanying text supra. 
212 See D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, § 609, at 875. 
21s Id. See ako  note 107 and accompanying text supra. 
214 D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, 3 609, at  875. 
21"oldstein, supra note 165, at 85 n.58. 
'18 D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, 3 609, at 876. 
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concern, however, is less meritorious in tort cases. As many tort 
claims must be tried in courts that have jurisdiction to grant 
monetary relief in excess of $25,000,217 there are few forums 
available other than the SPCDD. Hence, the parties' expecta- 
tions will not be disappointed if a judge uses the discretion and 
power granted him under the statute to employ normal court 
rules, while still making a decision pursuant to simplified proce- 
dure. In addition, under the US,  judges have already estab- 
lished their own court rules, of which the parties will be aware 
prior to any agreement to submit a controversy to the court 
under the SPCDD.218 These rules lessen the likelihood that a 
judge will arbitrarily frustrate the parties' expectations of the 
procedure to be followed under the SPCDD. 
IV. COMPATIBILITY OF SPCDD WITH THE US SUGGESTIONS FOR 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURE 
There is little doubt that the excessive cost of litigation in 
New York219 and the high volume of civil cases swamping our 
state often make judicial decisionmaking cumbersome 
and inaccessible to many ~laimants.2~~ Judges and juries are 
0verworked.2~~ In 1987 eighteen percent of all civil cases were 
not disposed of within the fifteen month period disposition stan- 
a'7 The supreme court is the court of general jurisdiction in New York. N.Y. JUD. 
LAW § 140-b (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988). County courts and district courts, and the 
New York City Civil Court can hear claims up to $25,000. N.Y. JUD. LAW 190 (McKin- 
ney 1983 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT $3 201, 213 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 
1988). The New York City Civil Court can hear claims up to $15,000. N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. 
CT. ACT S S  201-13 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1988). 
2'8 Under the IAS each judge issues "information sheets" with his or her own rules. 
See Carlisle, supra note 1, a t  85. 
See Burger, supra note 16, a t  296. Chief Justice Burger points out that the cost 
of lawyers fees to litigants has increased faster than the inflated cost of living. In addi- 
tion, abuse of the pretrial process adds to the high cost of litigation. Id. 
See note 5 and accompanying text supra. 
22' Cooke, supra note 15, a t  612 n.4. See also Bell, Crisis in the Courts: Proposals 
for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 2, 8 (1978). 
222 E. JOHNSON. JR, PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROCESS- 
ING CIVIL DISPUTES 2 (1978); Belli, The Law's Delays: Reforming Unnecessary Delay in 
Civil Litigation, 8 J. LEGIS. 16 (1981) (If congestion in the courts is not diminished, the 
judicial system may deteriorate to the point where "laymen will be tempted to circum- 
vent the legal process entirely."); Cooke, supra note 15, a t  612 ("The conventional forum 
for dispute resolution, the court, has become a beleaguered institution."). See also CHIEF 
ADLIINISTRATOR'S EPORT, supra note 5, a t  2-1 (New York state courts disposed of 
3,527,362 cases in 1987). 
Heinonline - -  54 Brook. L. Rev. 125 1988-1989 
126 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54: 95 
dard mandated by the Office of Court Administratio11.2~~ The 
Governor's Advisory Committee on Liability Insurance deems 
the tort crisis in New York serious enough to have recommended 
that the legislature amend the current statutory authorization of 
mandatory court-annexed arbitration of tort cases by raising the 
limit on case value from $6,000 to $25,000.224 Similarly, the Uni- 
fied Court System in the state of New York has recently an- 
nounced a five point plan to aggressively expand ADR use in 
New Y ~ r k . ~ ~ ~  This means that many cases that should be heard 
by judges will be shifted to ADR f o r~ rns ,2~~  where citzens can 
resolve their own cases. 
The SPCDD represents a solution to our state court litiga- 
tion The procedure is well suited for resolving disputes 
where the actual amount in controversy is between $25,000 and 
$100,000.228 Full utilization of the SPCDD will enable litigants 
to obtain judicial decisions more economically, both in terms of 
time and litigation costs. It will also relieve crowded court dock- 
ets and permit judges and juries to devote more time to complex 
cases that require full-blown litigation. Similarly, use of the 
SPCDD will permit judges to more fully exercise their supervi- 
sory powers under the 
A. IAS and SPCDD 
For many years New York courts used the Master Calendar 
S y ~ t e m . 2 ~ ~  Under this system, cases were before the court but 
not before any particular j~dge.2~' Motions were filed before 
"terms" and whichever judge was assigned to the term disposed 
of the motion. If numerous motions were filed in a dispute, as 
was often the case, many different judges had to become familiar 
223 See CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR'S EPORT, supra note 5, a t  2-4, 2-8, 2-11, 2-16. 
224 See GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMM'N ON LIABILITY INSURANCE, INSURING YOUR FU- 
TURE 178 (1986) [hereinafter JONES 111. 
226 See Bellacosa, supra note 4, a t  34, col. 6. 
228 Id. 
227 See notes 157-68 and accompanying text supra. See generally Jones 11, a t  58-70 
(describing tort litigation crisis that exists in New York). See generally Tort Crisis Re- 
port, A.B.A. J., Jan. 11, 1987, a t  1-7 (describing general tort crisis in United States). 
228 See 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 29, a t  ll 3033. 
229 See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 202.3(a) (a single judge has continuous supervision over a sin- 
gle case). See also REPORT O THE CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 5, a t  1, 6-15. 
230 See The Individual Assignment System, supra note 1, a t  1-2. 
231 Id. 
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with the facts underlying the d i~pu t e . 2~~  Then, if the case went 
on to trial, another judge would try 
The Master Calendar System made it difficult, if not impos- 
sible, to utilize the SPCDD. With managerial responsibility for a 
case resting in many hands, simplified procedures under the 
SPCDD could not be uniformly im~lemented.2~' Moreover, liti- 
gation under the SPCDD, which contemplated judicial supervi- 
sion by one judge, was not easily harmonized with a system that 
de-emphasized individual judicial accountability for control and 
disposition of d i sp~ t e s . 2~~  Consequently, the SPCDD, as a means 
of resolving disputes, "languished at  the very brink of 
atrophy."238 
The enactment of the IAS on January 6,1986 means that in 
all civil actions in the supreme court and county courts, the 
Master Calendar System has been replaced by an individual cal- 
endar system.237 New uniform rules provide that a "preliminary 
conference" may become a general part of litigati0n.2~~ A funda- 
mental purpose of the conference is to establish a timetable for 
the completion of all disclosure pro~eedings.2~~ The objective is 
to have the case ready for trial within one year after the judge 
receives it.240 This goal contemplates the active supervision of 
cases by the judi~iary.2'~ If a party fails to comply with a judge's 
order pursuant to the preliminary conference, the court may im- 
n3a Id. 
233 Id. 
234 See note 192 and accompanying text supra. 
235 See note 230 and accompanying text supra. 
238 See D. SIEGEL, supra note 29, 5 609, a t  874. 
237 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGS. tit. 22, 8 202.3 (1986). The IAS is also being 
applied in different levels of the trial courts. See id. a t  205.3 for the rules governing the 
Family Court. For rules governing the Court of Claims, see id. a t  $5 206.3 & 210.3. The 
IAS is not used in the New York Civil Court or in the district courts. See id. a t  $5 208.3, 
212.3. See also note 175 and accompanying text supra. 
23R See id. a t  3 202.12 (preliminary conference mandatory in most cases unless dis- 
closure can be completed without court intervention). See ako The Preliminary Confer- 
ence, supra note 175, a t  1. The court may order a conference as to any matter i t  finds 
necessary. N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGS. tit. 22,s 202.12(c) (1986). See also note 175 and 
accompanying text supra. Title 22 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations has 
been amended as of April 1, 1988 to make the mandatory preliminary conference 
optional. 
238 See The Preliminary Conference, supra note 175, a t  2. 
Id. 
N.S. COMP. CODES R & REGS. tit. 22, 202.3 (1986). 
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pose sanctions.242 Thus, the increased discretionary managerial 
role of state court judges under the IAS is similar to that au- 
thorized by the SPCDD.24S The major difference is that under 
the SPCDD a judge is the fact finder2" and may order the par- 
ties to dispense with unlimited and burdensome disclosure.24s 
Recently, a distinguished panel appointed by the Chief 
Judge of the New York Court of Appeals found that the IAS is 
not working effectively because judges do not make enough ef- 
fort to force litigants to settle their disputes before going to 
trial.246 Several modifications to the IAS constituting significant 
departures from the individual case method have been sug- 
ge~ted.~" A primary concern is that in 1987 eighteen percent of 
civil cases lingered in the system longer than the fifteen month 
disposition standard.248 Cases linger under the IAS because 
judges do not have the time to actively supervise and facilitate 
settlement of complex rnatter~?'~ Full utilization of the SPCDD 
would enable judges to manage small claims more efficiently by 
limiting pre-trial disclosure and by participating more actively 
in settlement negotiati0ns.2~~ Use of the SPCDD, then, would 
comply with the spirit and letter of the IAS by permitting 
judges to devote more time to larger cases worthy of their 
consideration. 
B. Implementation of the SPCDD 
In other jurisdictions, simplified procedural statutes such as 
the SPCDD have been successfully implemented where the 
bench and bar have cooperated to publicize the procedure 
through continuing legal education programs, law journal arti- 
2'2 See note 176 and accompanying text supra. 
243 See N.Y. CN. PRAC. L. & R. F( 3036 (McKinney 1974). 
14' Id. at F( 3031. 
2 4 V d .  at 5 3036. See generally notes 184-85 and accompanying text supra. 
2'6 See CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR'S REPORT, supra note 5, at 1. 
247 Id. at 8-19. 
2'8 Id. at 7. See N.Y.S. UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT SUPPORT, RE- 
PORT OF 1986 CASELOAD CTIVATING THE SUPREME AND COUNTY COURTS UNDER THE INDI- 
VIDUAL ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM, table CV6 (Feb. 1987) (available at State of New York Of- 
fice of Court Administration). 
2'g See REPORT O THE CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 5, at 8-9. See generally Wise, IAS 
'Effective', supra note 4, at 1, col. 3. 
REPORT O THE CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 5, at 10, 15. 
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cles, and judicial information ~heets.2~' For example, the Califor- 
nia Continuing Legal Education bar conducted programs 
throughout the state to alert lawyers to their Economic Litiga- 
tion Program (ELP).262 This program is similar in most respects 
to the SPCDD. The Los Angeles Law Journal devoted substan- 
tial portions of two of its weekly publications to the ELP. Sev- 
eral courts attached bright yellow notices on the original sum- 
monses and defendants' first papers calling attention to the 
pr0gram.2~~ Pennsylvania has undertaken similar steps to pro- 
mote its Early Settlement Conferencing and Pretrial Evaluation 
(Escape) 
The New York State Bar Association has an active state- 
wide continuing education office. Certainly programs similar to 
those used in California could be presented on a regional basis. 
Also, under the IAS each judge issues "information sheets" list- 
ing the particular rules of his or her court.2ss These sheets could 
call attention to the SPCDD. Special forms calling attention to 
the SPCDD could also be attached for distribution whenever a 
lawyer is assigned to a judge under the IAS. 
Recently, a distinguished judge of the New York Court of 
Appeals advocated the vigorous promotion of educational pro- 
grams by law schools and bar associations to expand citizen 
awareness of ADR meth0ds.2~~ New York's five point educa- 
tional program to establish citizen justice centers will also in- 
crease awareness of ADR meth0ds.2~~ Similar public relations ef- 
forts could be made on behalf of the SPCDD. 
Over twenty percent of the nation's lawsuits will be filed in 
New York state courts.268 Last year New York state courts dis- 
Epstein, supra note 209, at 65. 
Id. The Los Angeles County Bar Association, the Lawyers Club, the Association 
of Southern California Defense Counsel and many other California bar groups have also 
conducted educational programs on the ELP. Id. See notes 189,209-10 and accompany- 
ing text supra. 
Epstein, supra note 209, at 65. 
lM Id. 
285 See Carliile, supra note 1, at 85. See also note 218 and accompanying text supra. 
Bellacosa, supra note 4, at 34, col. 5. 
257 Id. See also note 225 and accompanying text supra. 
258 See The Hon. Chief Judge Sol Wachtler, Remarbs at the Annual Dinner of the 
New York State Bar Association (January 17, 1986) (available in the files of the Brook- 
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posed of more cases than the entire federal judiciary.26@ Thus, it 
makes good sense to emphasize ADR methods. These methods, 
however, are often duplicative of functions performed by our 
overworked judiciary.200 If the purpose of our judicial system is 
to resolve disputes, litigants should not be cost-factored out of 
courts and forced to select ADR forums. 
The SPCDD guarantees litigants access to efficient and in- 
expensive judge-rendered justice without compromising their 
rights under the federal and state  constitution^.^^^ It is particu- 
larly applicable to small tort cases, many of which do not require 
the full adjudicative process. It is also compatible with judicial 
management under the IAS and will serve as a worthwhile tool 
for judges who seek to control their court calendars. This author 
strongly encourages the implementation of programs designed to 
heighten the bar's awareness to this simplified method of resolv- 
ing disputes. 
lyn Law Review). 
2=8 Id. 
280 Metaxas, supra note 16, a t  1 (distinguished commentators suggest that many 
ADR forums are "a duplicative process that adds layers to an already overly complex 
judicial system"). 
281 A fundamental tenet of due process is access to the courts. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV 3 2. The proliferation of ADR systems appear to restrict such access. See 
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (prisoners guaranteed right of access to the 
courts). 
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